Google's Ad tech Antitrust Remedies

I’m Alan Chapell. I’ve been working at the intersection of privacy, competition, advertising and music for decades and I’m now writing for The Monopoly Report. If you have a tip to share in confidence, find me on Twitter or Bluesky.

Our latest Monopoly Report podcast is out with Daniel Solove, Bernard Professor of Intellectual Property and Technology Law at the George Washington University Law School and Author of the new book On Privacy and Technology. Daniel and I talk about some of the privacy challenges posed by technology and how they can be addressed.

How to Remedy Google’s Ad Tech Monopoly

On May 5, 2025, both Google and the U.S. Department of Justice and seventeen states (“Government” or “DOJ”) made their initial proposal for addressing Google’s ad tech monopoly.

By now, you’ve probably read a bunch of articles focusing on the specifics of the respective proposals. I share a thumbnail of each proposal towards the bottom of the article. But first, I wanted to outline my general thoughts - just in case some of you don’t make it all the way to the bottom of the page. (You know who you are….)

What to make of the proposals?

My approach to this is analogous to the way one might evaluate how the NY Jets fared in the recent NFL draft. You can’t just look at one component - you need to look at the totality of the selections in light of how they’ll make the team (or in this case, the marketplace) better.

However, that also means that a change to one portion of the proposal (e.g., removal of prohibition on the use of Google’s first-party data for its network business) could have a significant impact on how the entirety of the proposal hangs together.

Moreover, I want to emphasize that this is only phase one in a process that - even given the speed of the rocket docket - is going to last at least into next fall. It’s the starting point of a negotiation. And there’s no reason to think that the parties won’t adjust their proposals as they make their way through the rest of the remedies phase.

With those caveats, here are my thoughts…

The Government’s Proposal

• Structural vs. Behavioral vs Blend - I’ve been a vocal proponent of broad divestment as “least bad option” in both of the Google DOJ antitrust cases. My rationale is that Google is likely to game most behavioral remedies. The Government is pushing for a combination of structural (e.g., AdX divestment) and behavioral (i.e., interoperability, cost transparency) with some other nuggets thrown in. In my view, a good reason to push a blended solution like this is if you think it will create incentives for Google to support the open web rather than abandon it entirely and push it’s demand to its Owned/Operated properties even more quickly. I’m not sure the Government has stuck the landing, but I can appreciate both the effort and the difficulty of the attempt.

   

• Left hand not talking to right hand? – The remedies trial in the separate Google search case has gone into some detail on the challenges of imposing behavioral remedies involving Google opening up its platforms and granting access to data. (For example, the search remedies trial noted Google’s response under the EU DMA to a request by MSFT for data which resulted in… very little actual data being turned over - h/t to Megan Gray). Based on the Government’s proposal here, it doesn’t appear that those learnings have made their way to the Government’s initial ad tech remedy proposal. Even with a compliance trustee, I continue to have concerns that there’s too much wiggle room for Google.

   

• The neutral industry association - The document makes several references to a “neutral industry association” to which Google is required to provide an API in DFP to allow the association to host the final auction outside of DFP. They’re referring to Prebid, right?

• Escrow = Transparency? – The Government proposal to place 50% of AdX and DFP net revenues in escrow until DFP divestiture is complete might just be my favorite part of all this. The funding will help with switching costs. Also, Google has rarely broken those types of numbers out. (I saw something in the trial exhibits, but that dates back to 2010). Anything that increases the level of transparency around what Google charges pubs for various components of its pub tech stack strikes me as a huge plus.

• Mobile is pretty much the forgotten platform in these proceedings – OK. This is more of an aside. I recognize that this case is decidedly NOT about mobile, but it’s pretty remarkable how little attention that the mobile app side of things has received overall. Cookie deprecation and Sandbox under CMA? (Nothing on GAID). Chrome divestment in the search trial? (Android is only the fallback divestment option). Mobile app ads are out of scope in this case too. Anyway, it’s a bit odd – as many of the issues identified with respect to desktop are also present with respect to mobile.

• Limiting Google’s use of “first party” data in its network - The “fist-party data” prohibition (see full quote below) is the most interesting aspect of the Government’s proposal. While I love the attempt, I have concerns that this provision will devalue what Google advertisers are willing to pay for network inventory - and ultimately, hasten Google’s exit from its traditional network business entirely.

Google’s Proposal

Not much meat here, but….

• Promise NOT to resurrect First / Last Look - This strikes me as too specific - and has the feel of addressing the symptoms but not the disease. In other words, Google is way too good at finding alternative ways to create self-preferencing levers. Also, I’ve heard from people I trust that First/Last Look might not have exactly left the building back in 2019.

• Divestment is too Difficult - Google may very well be right re: the complexities around divestiture of AdX and DFP. And perhaps that’s why the Government has proposed a phased divestiture. But all those complexities and opacities don’t exactly bode well for some third-party trustee to be able to step in and monitor so as to ensure that Google isn’t self-preferencing.

What did Google Propose?

Google's proposed remedies are fairly simple (the below is mostly copy/paste):

1. Require Google to make AdX real-time bids for open-web display ads available to all rival publisher ad servers;

2. Require Google to deprecate Unified Pricing Rules (“UPR”) and instead enable publishers to set different price floors for different bidders, including for different ad exchanges and different buying tools;

3. Enjoin Google from rebuilding the auction effects known as “first look” and “last look” as well as UPR; and

4. Appoint a trustee agreed upon by the parties to monitor compliance for a period of three years.

My Comment: Three years - LOL!

Government Proposal

Here’s a thumbnail of what the Government is seeking from Google (partial cut and paste):

• Google prohibited from “operating an ad exchange, or any product with similar functionality that transacts any open web display advertising”,

• Google to divest AdX immediately,

• Google to do a phased divestment of DPF (which I can’t decide yet is brilliant or a train wreck of complications),

• Google prohibited from non-discriminatory dealings between Google’s buy-side tools and third-party ad tech (including DPA and AdX),

• Google prohibited from engaging in preferential routing of buy side demand or tying its platforms,

• Google must place 50% of AdX and DFP net revenues in escrow to fund publisher transition as well as the unnamed industry association,

• Google must share certain data generated by DFP (e.g., auction logic data) with the industry association and advertisers,

• Google can’t use data generated from its Owned/Operated properties like YouTube “to inform AdWords’ or DV360’s bidding on, buying, or evaluation of digital advertising inventory on third-party tools and/or websites, or to preference any Google product over any competing product”,

• Google must “allow publishers to access data generated in DFP or AdX from their inventory in the same format as Google can access said data”,

• Google must appoint trustees to oversee divestiture, overall compliance, and avoid retaliation against those who testified against Google,

• Google must pay for employee training to help avoid future misuse of the a/c privilege and spoliation of evidence subject to a litigation hold.

My Comment: There’s so much here for a monitoring trustee(s) to keep track of. Btw, did anyone find the monitoring trustee to be at all helpful when used in connection with the UK CMA imposed Privacy Sandbox Commitments? Overall, this doesn’t do much to slow down Google’s exit from the open web - although that may be irreversible at this point.

As you probably know by now - Google is the house. And the house always wins.

__________________________________________________________________________

If there’s an area that you want to see covered on these pages, if you agree/disagree with something I’ve written, if you want tell me you dig my music, or if you just want to yell at me, please reach out to me on LinkedIn or in the comments below.